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The Issue 
U.S. ethanol policy has several drivers. Among these are increasing the incomes of U.S. 
corn farmers, enhancing the environment, providing a source of sustainable energy, and 
reducing  dependence  on  foreign  oil.  Each  of  these  has  its  own  advocates  and  critics. 
While it is true that ethanol production can enhance the incomes of corn farmers, some 
ask  who  benefits  more  from  the  public  subsidy  of  ethanol  production  –  farmers  or 
processors.  Some  question  whether  ethanol  always  delivers  a  clean  air  benefit  and 
whether it provides a source of sustainable energy while reducing dependence on foreign 
oil. The large public subsidy provided for ethanol production is yet another issue. While 
all of the above considerations relate to ethanol policy, this article focuses primarily on 
energy-related issues.  
The  context for ethanol policy is U.S. energy policy,  which is almost exclusively 
supply driven. Consistent with this thrust, the current target is to increase annual ethanol 
production from 3 billion to 5 billion gallons over the next several years. At the direct 
subsidy level of $US0.52 per gallon of ethanol produced, this level of production will 
result in a public expenditure of US$2.6 billion. The question is, what other options might 
provide better energy alternatives on the basis of cost and other considerations? 
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Implications and Conclusions 
Ethanol is a minor component of the supply-oriented U.S. energy policy. It is reasonable 
to ask whether we would perceive the same pressing need to produce ethanol for energy 
supply reasons if U.S. energy policy were more diverse. Would policy makers consider 
options like demand reduction?  Would they view energy use in terms of the services 
provided rather than in terms of the form, time and place constraints associated with a 
particular energy source? Alternative policy options might be undertaken, and analysis of 
these alternatives is worthwhile. Highly subsidized ethanol production does not make a 
major contribution to reducing liquid petroleum imports to the United States. And ethanol 
production  has  evolved  so  that  it  requires  what  is  now  another  critical  strategic  fuel, 
natural gas. The issue is not whether ethanol production is a net calorie gainer or loser; 
rather, it is whether ethanol reduces strategic dependence and provides a needed form of 
fuel or energy service at lower opportunity cost when compared with demand reduction or 
other means of providing an energy service. Finally, the subsidy for ethanol production 
might be redesigned to mitigate the boom-bust nature of this capital-based processing 
industry and make full costs and subsidies more transparent. 
Background 
A set of important relationships exists between the production process and the economics 
of ethanol. An excellent source of information about these relationships is Tiffany and 
Eidman (2003). The cost of the corn feedstock is the major driver in the cost of ethanol 
production. The “catch 22” of ethanol production is that farmers desire higher corn prices 
and thus promote ethanol production. The desired higher corn prices make ethanol more 
expensive to produce, requiring either high petroleum prices or increased subsidies to 
make  ethanol profitable.  Table 1 illustrates various ethanol price and corn break-even 
costs for a 40 million gallon per year dry-milling plant, typical of many being built in the 
United States today. 
Table 1  Break-even Corn Costs and Ethanol Prices 
Corn cost (US$/bu)  Ethanol price (US$/gal) 
2.43  1.15 
3.00  1.42 
3.88  1.85 
Source: Tiffany and Eidman, 2003 
Thus, if corn cost $US2.43, ethanol would have to sell for at least $US1.15 for the plant to 
break even. An ethanol price of $US1.15 was not uncommon in 2002, and corn costs were 
below $US2.43. In early 2004, corn cost as much as $US3.00. However, the ethanol price, 
which had been near the break-even point of $US1.42, rose to above $US1.85. In thisCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  O. C. Doering 
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example, with corn at $US3.00 and with ethanol selling at $US1.85, the profit level on 
ethanol is $US0.43 per gallon. 
Energy  costs  involved  in  producing  ethanol  are  not  insubstantial.  The  fuel  most 
commonly used is natural gas. To illustrate of the relative impacts of changes in the costs 
of natural gas and corn, an increase in the cost of natural gas from $US4.50 to $US6.50 
per MM BTUs would have to be compensated for by a decrease in the cost of corn from 
$US2.43  to  $US2.24  per  bushel  for  the  plant  to  achieve  the  same  break-even  point. 
Continued high natural gas costs will put pressure on ethanol profitability. 
Ethanol  prices  have  tended  to  follow  gasoline  prices  –  ethanol  being  seen  as  a 
gasoline substitute. When ethanol was initially viewed as an oxygenate, its price began to 
reflect its substitution for other oxygenates. Today the substitution is for MTBE (methyl 
tertiary butyl ether), but the price tracking still is closely related to basic gasoline prices. 
During times of relatively stable petroleum prices, high corn prices would normally result 
in reduced margins for ethanol production. Figure 1 presents the results of a profitability 
index developed for ethanol using prices for unleaded gasoline, corn and natural gas. This 
index is based on the production assumptions that one bushel of corn and 165,000 BTUs 
of natural gas will produce 2.7 gallons of ethanol and 17 pounds of dry distillers’ grain 
(Paulson et al., 2004).  
For most of the period, from the 1990 index levels to 2004, the index of ethanol gross 
margins is below the baseline of July 1990. When corn prices moved down and gasoline 
prices moved up, the ethanol gross margin index moved up. Late 1990 is a good example 
of this and July 2000 is another. In July 1996 the index went strongly negative because of 
very high corn prices and gasoline prices that were near the baseline. The critical question 
for 2004 to 2006 and beyond is whether corn prices are likely to moderate and petroleum 
prices stay relatively high. If so, the information in table 1 would postulate a large ethanol 
gross margin – much larger than that projected in figure 1. Thus, the coming several years 
may be very profitable for ethanol production. This scenario raises two related questions: 
What is the appropriate level of subsidy? How should the subsidy level be determined? 
The  current  subsidy  of  $US0.52  per  gallon  of  ethanol  is  scheduled  to  be  reduced  to 
$US0.51 in 2005. 
One of the most contentious issues with respect to ethanol production is the caloric 
accounting argument. Does ethanol production use more energy than that embodied in the 
final product? i.e., is ethanol a net energy gainer or loser? This disagreement started in the 
1970s  and  has  continued  unabated  over  the  intervening  decades.  The  most  recent 
exchange involves David Pimentel, one of the original protagonists, and several authors 
from  the  USDA  Office  of  Energy  Policy  and  New  Uses  (Pimentel,  2003;  Shapouri, 
Duffield and  Wang, 2002).  The argument hinges on estimates of calories required by 
various processes and embodied in various inputs and also upon where one draws the 
calorie  accounting  envelope  around  ethanol  production.  Both  the  envelope  and  the Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  O. C. Doering 
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calories assigned to inputs and processes have been modified over time as technology and 
assumptions have changed. An early set of approaches to this accountancy illustrating 
these differences was that of Pimentel (1976) and Doering (1977). The first of these two 
works  was  a  static  example  based  on  an  accounting  approach,  and  the  second  was  a 
simulation approach. Not only did the process assumptions and the envelopes employed 
by these two approaches differ, but the determinants of productivity of inputs differed as 
well. In a sense it was an apples-and-oranges comparison because assumptions were so 
different, and this mismatch continues today. 
The critical question is whether the calories battle really matters! The judgment here 
is that it does not matter for making policy. This judgment hinges on the policy objective 
for producing ethanol. If one is producing ethanol to add sustainable energy from biomass 
to  our  energy  stock,  then  a  net  energy  gain  may  matter.  If  one  is  producing  ethanol 
because we are short of liquid fuels, it does not matter. Assuming one used abundant coal 
and natural gas to make machinery, produce fertilizer and power ethanol plants, we would 
be using solid and gas forms of energy that we had in abundance to produce a liquid fuel 
that was in short supply. What has changed this initially logical conversion of solids and 
gas to liquids is the fact that the North American continent is no longer self-sufficient in 
natural gas. In addition, we have generally been firing ethanol plants not with coal, but 
with natural gas. Natural gas is a major feedstock for the total ethanol production system. 
Increases in ethanol production will require increased imports of natural gas at the margin. 
Aside  from  strategic  supply  concerns,  one  can  carry  this  argument  on  to  logical  (or 
illogical)  conclusions  with  another  trade-off  and  claim  that  increased  use  of  corn  for 
ethanol production lowers corn exports that would otherwise earn foreign exchange to pay 
for imported liquid and gas fuels. The test is which of these arguments really matters for 
policy. 
Natural gas is important to U.S. energy policy and strategic concerns because natural 
gas use since the oil embargo of the 1970s has shifted towards uses where its unique 
attributes are less important. Initially, the bulk of our natural gas was used for special 
heating  applications  (like  food  drying  and  heat-treating  metals),  home  heating  and 
cooking, commercial space heating and chemical feedstocks. One change at the time of 
the OPEC oil embargo was a shift in industry to dual-fired boiler capacity. From the 
embargo on, industrial firms designed process heating systems so that they could switch 
between oil and natural gas. Initially this was done for reliability, but ultimately fuels 
were switched on the basis of which fuel was least expensive. For a period after the OPEC 
oil embargo, natural gas was scarce and its use in electricity generation was not allowed. 
However, the combination of an ensuing glut of natural gas, a return to long-term supply 
contracts,  the  compelling  economics  of  utility  deregulation  and  the  environmental 
advantages of using natural gas over coal led to increasing amounts of natural gas being 
used for electricity generation. Both industrial and especially electric power generation Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  O. C. Doering 
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uses of natural gas have surged since the high price/low availability period of the mid-
1980s while residential use is about the same as it was in the 1970s (National Petroleum 
Council, 2003).  
What does this mean for ethanol? If ethanol production depends on natural gas (for 
process heat and for fertilizer) and natural gas is increasingly imported, then ethanol may 
provide  a  scarce  liquid  fuel,  but  its  strategic  advantage  is  moderated  by  the  fact  that 
strategic  natural  gas  now  is  required  for  ethanol  production.  Yet,  it  is  the  strategic 
advantage of reducing import dependence that many see as a critical reason for ethanol 
production. 
One alternative that might obviate these issues would be substantial investment in 
renewable energy, especially liquids from biomass. A recent inclusive compendium of the 
potential opportunities claims that nearly 50 percent of U.S. energy needs could be met 
with renewable sources (Pimentel et al., 2002). The applicable question here is whether 
ethanol  can  be  produced  economically  with  biomass  feedstock  rather  than  with  corn. 
While  this  technology  has  had  promise  since  the  1970s,  it  has  not  yet  lived  up  to 
expectations. Conceivably such feedstocks could allow greater production of ethanol at 
lower calorie and dollar cost.    
The more basic question for ethanol policy hinges on the supply orientation of U.S. 
energy  policy.  Are  the  opportunity  costs  for  meeting  energy  needs  more  favourable 
elsewhere? There are two aspects to consider in looking for other ways to meet energy 
needs. One is utilizing substitute energy sources to do the same work or provide the same 
service as a scarce energy source. The other is reducing demand. Both of these approaches 
were seriously developed in the period immediately following the OPEC oil embargo. 
This is illustrated in table 2, from a U.S. Department of Transportation study on future 
paths for transportation fuels and systems under different scenarios of fuel and alternative 
system development. Note that the metric here is “transportation petroleum equivalents”. 
Table 2  1981 Resource Cost of Transportation Petroleum Equivalents 
Area of development  Cost ($US/bbl) 
Shale oil  32.21–35.73 
Coal liquids  40.69–46.08 
Auto fuel economy  25.37–38.23 
Biomass  59.00–52.10 
Railroad electrification  22.82–24.88 
Source: Whitford et al., 1981 
This  study  was  done  some  years  ago  and  the  absolute  numbers  are  certainly  not 
necessarily accurate today. However, the relative numbers do have meaning and illustrate Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  O. C. Doering 
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a broader scope of policy options that one might consider – especially on an opportunity 
cost basis. The critical points of comparison include the fact that liquids from biomass are 
relatively expensive. Reducing auto fuel demand through increasing auto fuel economy is 
one of the less expensive options, as it still is today (Congressional Budget Office, 2003). 
Railroad electrification is the least expensive option for “creating” liquid fuel, that is, for 
providing the same energy service from a very different energy source, in this case solid 
coal  instead  of  liquid  petroleum.  The  assumption  here  was  that  we  could  increase 
electricity production from coal in an environmentally acceptable way at a relative service 
cost  lower  than  other  alternatives;  in  addition,  the  petroleum  equivalent  generated  is 
modest.   
Critical to this approach is the notion of energy services that was promoted by Roger 
Sant (1979). This approach breaks the form, time and place constraints. What are desired 
in  the  example  above  are  transportation  services.  Both  today  and  prior  to  the  OPEC 
embargo, transportation is viewed as tied to the availability of liquid fuels. Investment and 
technology are bounded by the liquid fuel–form supply paradigm. We broke out of that in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s because it was evident that such supply might not always 
be available. We then returned to a supply focus when petroleum (and natural gas) prices 
declined and supply seemed assured. 
Assessment 
Ethanol is still a component of the supply paradigm. The  United States  will probably 
increase ethanol production to 5 billion gallons a year over the next several years and 
continue to pay a subsidy to do so. If ethanol processing is not powered by coal and 
fertilizer is not freed from dependence on natural gas, it is going to be increasingly hard to 
make the case that we are producing a scarce liquid fuel out of abundant or non-strategic 
resources. The argument that ethanol will free us from dependence upon outside sources 
of petroleum does not hold. When U.S. ethanol production ramps up to 5 billion gallons, 
ethanol will supply approximately 3.5 percent of current U.S. gasoline needs. A demand 
reduction approach that increased fuel efficiency standards by 3.8 miles a gallon for cars 
and light trucks could reduce gasoline consumption by 10 percent (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2003).   
At some point options beyond the current focus on energy supply would appear to be 
compelling.  However,  these  were  only  considered  in  the  past  when  absolute  supply 
restrictions were real and thought to be permanent. Ethanol policy should probably not be 
based on the battle of the calories. There are numerous other bases for making ethanol 
policy  and  the  narrow  focus  of  calorie  balance  as  a  national  goal  is  outweighed  by 
strategic and other concerns. The calorie argument also keeps us firmly within the supply 
paradigm.  
Given that we are likely to continue producing ethanol, one question is, what should 
be the level of the subsidy? A suggestion would be to utilize a measure like the index of Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  O. C. Doering 
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ethanol gross margins to adjust the subsidy as conditions, costs and prices change over 
time, preventing boom and bust situations. This concept will face objections from free 
market proponents. However, with the high subsidy this is not a free market good, and it 
would not be produced without the subsidy. A variable subsidy could have features like 
proposals  for  public  utility  incentive  regulation.  Ethanol  production  has  public  utility 
aspects, it is just not thought of as such. 
Finally,  the  argument  here  is  not  that  we  should  give  up  ethanol  production  or 
abandon  other  supply  efforts,  but  that  we  must  assess  and  embrace  other  options  as 
conditions dictate.  
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